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Abstract 
Bersot and Arrigo (this issue) find that judges in the U.S. district and appellate courts 
generally defer to prison officials in Eighth Amendment challenges over punitive segregation 
of mentally ill inmates, effectively allowing mistreatment.  In these cases, judges tend to 
channel formalist and utilitarian logics.  Bersot and Arrigo maintain that these logics 
conduce to maltreatment of inmates.  However, we believe that if judges actually evaluated 
prison policy along utilitarian lines, drawing on criminological research and assigning special 
value to basic human rights, convicts and would-be convicts would be better treated in and 
out of prison.  Criminal justice agents who perpetrate or permit harm bring a value 
orientation to their work that is not so dissimilar to ours, but they circumscribe the 
beneficiaries of concern differently. 
  
 
Introduction 
A critical challenge for these times is how to talk people out of doing harm.  Quite often we 
make that case with the argument that harming leads to more harm.  We generally attempt 
to show that perpetrating a particular harm causes the perpetrator greater eventual harm 
than any harm s/he might prevent.  Thus, if incarceration increases recidivism, yielding 
more crime, then (rational) people should oppose the use of incarceration.  If the death 
penalty brutalizes the populace, then people should oppose the death penalty.  These are 
utilitarian arguments: they refer to the expected net benefit of the act.   Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Commentary  
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Bersot and Arrigo (2010, this issue) take utilitarianism to be a problematic basis for criminal 
justice because “the needs of some individuals are subjectively perceived as more worthy 
than those of others” (p. 54).  Thus they conclude: “Determining the value of an individual 
according to their ability to contribute to the satisfaction of the majority is inherently 
troubling” (p. 56).  In their study Bersot and Arrigo find that utilitarianism as well as 
formalism – adherence to moral duties – informs judicial decisions concerning the use of 
punitive segregation with mentally ill inmates.  For example, in Goff v. Harper (1997): 
“Although the court wanted to ensure that inmates were lawfully protected from cruel and 
unusual punishment, it sought to limit its imposition on the rights and interests of 
correctional administrators” (Bersot and Arrigo 2010, p. 48).  Bersot and Arrigo endorse an 
alternative, Aristotelian ethics for criminal justice.  A virtue-based, value or care ethics, it 
would emphasize human healing and growth.  Judges would seek to understand the convict 
as a person, and “virtues such as empathy, benevolence, and tolerance” (p. 58) would 
guide their decision-making.   
We question how Bersot and Arrigo‟s plea for this new ethical orientation will be 
received by prison administrators and judges.  Such an orientation is radically opposed to 
the utilitarian manner of reasoning in particular.  We are optimistic, however, that a more 
caring criminal justice might yet emerge in the current ethical climate.   
 
Entrenched 
The criminal justice system is entrenched in the ethics of formalism and consequentialism.  
Through careful analysis Bersot and Arrigo document two kinds of formalism, or allegiance 
to certain duties – one that stresses assigned roles and one that stresses human worth and 
dignity.  They write (p. 51): 
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In some instances, the bench expressed an obligation to defer to correctional 
administrators in their respective roles as prison managers.  In other instances, the 
bench endorsed a deontological duty to ensure that incarcerates benefited from the 
dignity that they deserved as human beings, notwithstanding their segregation from 
society and/or from others criminally confined. 
 
We see the connection between judges‟ tolerance of inmate mistreatment and their task-
oriented formalism, but not the Kantian variety that prioritizes human dignity.  However, in 
the criminal justice system, as in bureaucracies generally, commitment to work duties 
seems to have won out over commitment to moral duties.  Workers can disregard prisoner 
well-being insofar as their job description does not positively specify concern thereof.  
Workload demands have inspired rules that actually thwart caring: the Prison Litigation 
Reform Act is exemplary (see Bersot and Arrigo 2010, p. 21).   
Further, the modern emphasis on “the efficient control of internal system processes” 
(Feeley and Simon 1992, p. 450) ensures that inmates are de-individuated, conceived as 
elements of an inter-agency management task: this too obscures their suffering.  As Roy 
(2002) states: “By reducing others to parts, reduction makes it difficult for us to empathize 
with them and care about them” (p. 39).  Note that the system also de-individuates its 
workers.  As a consequence, workers can hardly be said to engage in ethical thinking.  
Rather, they allow the institution to do their thinking for them (Douglas 1986).  An extreme 
example of such non-thinking is judges‟ approval of punitive segregation because it is “a 
well established and penologically justified practice” (p. 1261, cited in Bersot and Arrigo p. 
36).  It is done therefore it is right.    
Couple the task-oriented and non-thinking institutional culture of the criminal justice 
system with the outcome orientation of Western culture: judges evidently have.  A 
consequentialist principle so pervades modern life that those of us who call for social reform 
for its own sake – in any arena, not just criminal justice – find that we must use the Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Commentary  
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language of consequentialism.  No wonder, then, that policy discussions of restorative 
justice generally incline toward questions of reduced recidivism (Presser, Gaarder and 
Hesselton 2007).  No wonder too that Bersot and Arrigo conclude their paper with a utility 
argument: “legal tribunals are encouraged to incorporate values-based reasoning into their 
judicial rulings.  Moreover, courts are reminded that when they promote such flourishing, all 
parties affected by crime benefit….” (p. 67).  With one word, moreover, the authors seem to 
suggest that right values ultimately should be adopted because they have utility.   
It is true that virtues do not per se guide the utilitarian‟s actions.  We admit: we wish 
they did.  We wish that human well-being in every instance were advanced because it is 
right to do so – a good in itself.  The first author (Presser 2004) has praised restorative 
justice for its present-orientation, stating (p. 102, emphasis in original): 
 
As restorative justice is called on to promote one or another belated outcome, I feel 
we stray from its unique potential – to be a humane experience of justice.   
 
However, in our view, utilitarianism does not necessarily ignore suffering.  It can be pressed 
into the service of care.  The problem of judicial neglect lies in the inadequate application of 
utilitarian theory, and not in utilitarian theory itself. 
 
Utilitarianism – A Closer Look 
Philosopher William Shaw (1999) lays out the utilitarian justification for punishment as 
follows (pp. 174-175): 
 
Punishment is justified if and only if (1) the pain and suffering (or, more broadly, the 
loss of welfare) to those who are punished is outweighed by the benefits of 
punishment and (2) those benefits cannot be achieved with less suffering or at a 
lower cost to those punished. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Commentary  
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As Shaw‟s statement shows and Bersot and Arrigo also acknowledge (pp. 21-22), utilitarian 
reasoning requires data to evaluate both costs and benefits.  Shaw continues (p. 179): 
 
[Utilitarians] are not wedded to the status quo but, rather, favor whatever system of 
criminal justice and whatever forms and mechanisms of punishment produce the 
greatest expected net benefit for society as a whole.  Determining this is no easy 
matter, and utilitarian reformers will doubtless proceed in an incremental fashion, 
basing their recommendations on the best available empirical data and on whatever 
insights psychology, social theory, and scientific criminology can provide. 
 
Given that alternatives to punitive segregation have not been adequately explored, the 
utilitarian will be unable to evaluate whether the benefits of punitive segregation – 
arguably, renewed order in the prison – cannot be achieved otherwise.  The Goff v. Harper 
(1997) court criticized the fact that effective alternatives involving psychiatric care were not 
used with mentally ill inmates.  To the best of our knowledge, restorative justice 
conferences have not been tried in response to inmate misconduct.  We see promise there.  
It is by now well established that both victims and offenders who participate in restorative 
justice conferences (in the “free” world) report greater satisfaction with the experience than 
comparable persons whose cases are handled by traditional courtroom procedures and 
sanctions (Latimer, Dowden and Muise 2005).  In addition, recidivism reduction and 
compliance with restitution agreements are significantly higher among offenders who 
participate in restorative justice programs than those who participate in non-restorative 
alternatives.     
Utilitarian calculations do not necessarily determine which interest groups ought to 
benefit from an action or policy, the conclusion that Bersot and Arrigo (p. 51) reach: 
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the legal opinions constituting this study‟s data set overwhelmingly sought the 
greater good for the majority (penal officials and society) over the minority 
(psychiatrically disordered inmates).   
 
Zero-sum results need not follow from utilitarian judgments.  Indeed, where punitive 
sanctions are concerned, costs may fall to both those punished and their punishers, as when 
the death penalty and incarceration increase recidivism rates (Shepherd 2005; Spohn and 
Holleran 2002).  Furthermore, utilitarianism leaves open the weights attached to various 
outcomes.  One can imagine a scenario where the suffering of any person is assessed as 
enormously costly.  It is entirely possible for human rights to make it onto the utilitarian 
agenda, as Shaw (1999) states (pp. 189-190): 
 
instilling in people respect for the rights of others and institutionalizing in society an 
almost absolute commitment to the protection of certain fundamental human rights 
form part of a wise, long-term strategy for safeguarding people‟s basic welfare 
interests and promoting human flourishing.  Far from being defensive about rights, 
utilitarians argue that only their theory can give a satisfactory account of them.  
They reject the traditional view that the existence of moral rights is simply self-
evident and that we are to settle conflicts over and between supposed rights by 
intuition. 
 
The flourishing of any person may also be counted as enormously beneficial to the 
collective.  Braithwaite and Pettit‟s (1990) republican theory of criminal justice, an avowedly 
consequentialist theory, states that maximization of human freedom should be the goal of 
any justice intervention.  Differential evaluation of the worth of those humans who would be 
free is key to all manner of imprisonment, but it is extraneous to the utilitarian philosophy 
generally associated with the founding of the prison.   Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Commentary  
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We suspect that if judges undertook fully-fledged cost-benefit analyses of criminal justice 
practices – including but not limited to prison-based practices – they might decide cases 
differently.  The fact that judges consistently ignore research indicating that the well-being 
of inmates may keep prisons peaceful and societies safer from crime, suggests a significant 
departure from utilitarianism.  Perhaps it is utilitarianism corrupted by the accommodation 
to duty ethics.  Or perhaps more than a little retribution informs judges‟ decisions.  It is 
entirely possibly that judges seek retribution but do not express it in their decisions because 
their position demands a value-free discourse.    
 
Empathy 
Those who would pursue or at least ignore the suffering of offenders/inmates are not so 
different from the rest of us.  They follow a virtues ethics, but they tell a different story 
about who its beneficiaries ought to be.  From a conservative perspective, the rights of 
inmates infringe upon the rights of crime victims and the rest of us (Lakoff 2002).  
Philosopher Jean Hampton (1988) finds: “the retributive motive for inflicting suffering is to 
annul or counter the appearance of the wrongdoer‟s superiority and thus affirm the victim‟s 
real value” (p, 130, emphasis in original).  „Care‟ is care for innocents, in this view.  
Therefore, we should encourage decision-makers to extend their concern.  We should show 
dichotomies between “guilty” and “innocent” to be false.  At their best, restorative justice 
dialogues can do this, questioning taken-for-granted statuses of “victim” and “offender” and 
exposing the breadth of responsibility for harm (Presser and Hamilton 2006). 
A plea to „care for all‟ is unlikely to work.  A values makeover is tough – for anyone.  
As humorist David Sedaris (2010) recently wrote, “If my own little mind is nailed shut, why 
wouldn‟t theirs be?” (p. 35).  Nor did Aristotle, nor do we marshal concern for all creatures, 
hence Albert Schweitzer‟s critique: “To found an ethical world-view on ethics which are only 
concerned with our fellow-man and human society is a logical impossibility.  Only when Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Commentary  
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ethics embrace the whole Universe is an ethical world-view really possible” (Schweitzer 
1936, pp. 259-260).  It is our forlorn conclusion that most of us draw distinctions between 
those whose suffering is too costly and those whose suffering we can abide.     
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